

Your Excellency, Mrs. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you very much for the opportunity to comment on Mr. Stoltenberg's report. My overall impression of this document is that it is a valuable, feasible and visionary paper, probably just the kind of thought provoking paper the Nordic governments had asked you to deliver.

Nordic Defence Cooperation has a long history, dating back to 1964 when the Nordic Defence Ministers established NORDSAMFN. The collaboration has focused on cooperation in international peace support operations, common training, and defence material procurement.

The lead star has always been a pragmatic approach. Projects considered mutually beneficial and consistent in conflict with different security policy solutions of the respective countries have been selected and maintained. Over the years this cooperation has resulted in an impressive list of successes. For example, I still think the Nordic-Polish Brigade in Bosnia and the Nordic Battalion in the UN led pre-emptive operation in Macedonia in the late 1990s continue to be crown jewels of Nordic cooperation. The first proposal in Stoltenberg's report builds on this solid foundation.

**The first proposal**, to establish a Nordic stabilisation task force to be deployed in states faced with major internal unrest or with other critical situations is a perfect step forward. Could we foresee a decision to use this Nordic Stabforce pre-emptively, deployed and working before the security situation in the target area has deteriorated beyond all solutions short of a heavily equipped Theatre Entry Force? Would the Nordic countries be prepared to support the activities of this Stabforce by committing a development aid package of a substantial amount of euros each, for some years? With our familiarity with a comprehensive approach (Whole of Government) and cooperation I think we really could make a difference, contributing to a safer and more stable world for all of us.

The most recent stage of Nordic Defence Cooperation, namely the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures, focuses in a broader way than earlier at the production of troops and capabilities. The Nordic Chiefs of Defence have identified approximately 140 bilateral or trilateral cooperative objectives, all aimed at improving cost-effectiveness and re-establishing the balance between defence budgets and required capabilities. By expanding the cooperation within the troop production, the operational out-

put will be improved and the countries will have more military assets in their command.

We have to ask: Will this cooperation work in times of crisis?

The Finnish precondition for all defence cooperation is that it should also work in times of crisis. Arrangements valid only when the sun is shining cannot be any part of serious defence related planning. With this in mind, let's move to the most interesting proposal in the Stoltenberg report, namely number 13.

**This proposal** in the Stoltenberg report suggests, that the Nordic governments should issue a mutual binding declaration of solidarity in which they commit themselves to clarifying how they would respond if a Nordic country were subject to external attack or undue pressure. A joint binding declaration of this kind would make it possible to engage in far closer military cooperation than is the case today.

I sincerely and fully agree with the idea. Having said that, I must admit, that this specific proposition also raises several questions

Finland has maintained a Nato membership option in her security politics since 1997 when the first governmental report on security and defence policy was issued.

The common defence, article 5, plays a rather important role in the Finnish Nato membership debate. You might ask, has article 5 become so weak, that Norway has to look for alternative solutions?

I think the situation is as follows. Yes, common defence continues to be at the core of the Alliance. But the world and the premises of common defence are changing. Let me show you a table:

While a Cold War type conflict is not today viewed to be a rationale course of action, conflicts are occurring and will continue to occur. Small nations will remain vulnerable to undue political, economic and military pressures, regional conflicts might escalate into regional wars, and the number of conflicts ignited by disputes related to the exploitation of diminishing natural resources will potentially be aspects of our security policy environment.

In this context nuclear weapons do not constitute any kind of functioning standard guarantee of common security. Evidently, the role of nuclear weapons is diminishing in our thinking.

As regarding integration and interdependence, we witnessed a rather stable period during the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, Nato had 15 members. The European Community consisted of 12 member states. Today we speak of EU 27 and Nato 28. If there is a limit to the geographical enlargement processes in Europe, remains to be seen.

World wide development follows similar patterns. Globalisation and the international market economy have enhanced the economic interdependence of nations all over the world.

I would now argue, that compared with the situation during the Cold War years, the development described above require that nations put more emphasise on their own capabilities to advance and safeguard their interests and to defend their territorial integrity. As national capabilities, especially those of small nations, are close to impossible to keep up in the long run; the solution is to downsize, or to enhance cooperation between neighbours, especially like-minded neighbours, or, to do both.

Though the Alliance remains the core prerequisite for any workable defence solution, practical reasons stemming from the change in the security policy environment ask for complementary arrangements between Alliance members and their neighbours.

I think this is the reason for Sweden's solidarity declaration, as well as the proposal for a mutual Nordic declaration of solidarity in the Stoltenberg report.

Your Excellency, as said, the essential precondition for all defence cooperation is that it will work also in times of crisis. Why then would Finland feel some reluctance in signing a Nordic declaration?

For Finland, all solidarity declarations without a larger European or transatlantic element put us in a slightly awkward position. In a possible conflict situation between Russia and an EU-member or a Nordic Country like Norway, we would be as between the hammer and the stow. Certainly we would like to help, but considering our geographical position, this would most probably lead to undue pressure against us – a situation where all scarce resources would be needed at home.

On the other hand, if we would one day decide to abandon our military non-alignment, all cooperative arrangements made between the Nordic nations would be greeted as wise politics – either by us, or by our children

Thank you for your attention!

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Stoltenberg's proposals:

1: A Nordic stabilisation task force should be established that can be deployed to states affected by major internal unrest or other critical situations where international assistance is desirable. It would be responsible for stabilising the situation and then creating an environment in which the state and political processes can function properly. It should include both civilian and military personnel.

2: The Nordic countries should take on part of the responsibility for air surveillance and air patrolling over Iceland. Initially, the Nordic countries could deploy personnel to the Keflavik base and take part in the regular Northern Viking exercises, which are organised by the Icelandic authorities. After this, they could take responsibility for some of the air patrols organised by NATO.

3: A Nordic system should be established for monitoring and early warning in the Nordic sea areas. The system should in principle be civilian and be designed for tasks such as monitoring the marine environment and pollution and monitoring of civilian traffic. The existing military surveillance systems are not particularly designed to carry out these tasks. A Nordic maritime monitoring system could have two pillars, one for the Baltic Sea ("Baltic Watch") and one for the North Atlantic, parts of the Arctic Ocean and the Barents Sea ("Barents Watch"), under a common overall system.

4: Once a Nordic maritime monitoring system is in place, a Nordic maritime response force should be established, consisting of elements from the Nordic countries' coast guards and rescue services. It should patrol regularly in the Nordic seas, and one of its main responsibilities should be search and rescue.

5: By 2020, a Nordic polar orbit satellite system should be established in connection with the development of a Nordic maritime monitoring system. Such a satellite sys-

tem could provide frequently updated real-time images of the situation at sea, which is essential for effective maritime monitoring and crisis management.

6: The Nordic countries, which are all members of the Arctic Council, should develop cooperation on Arctic issues focusing on more practical matters. The environment, climate change, maritime safety and search and rescue services are appropriate areas for such cooperation.

7: A Nordic resource network should be established to defend the Nordic countries against cyber attacks. Its main task would be to facilitate exchange of experience and coordinate national efforts to prevent and protect against such attacks and provide advice to Nordic countries that are in the process of building capacity in this area. In the longer term, the resource network could develop and coordinate systems for identifying cyber threats against the Nordic countries.

8: A Nordic disaster response unit should be established for dealing with large-scale disasters and accidents in the Nordic region and in other countries. The unit's main task would be to coordinate Nordic efforts as needed. It would maintain an overview of available equipment and personnel and establish a network made up of the many public and private organisations working in this field. The unit would set up Nordic groups/teams to meet specific needs, for example in the field of advanced search and rescue.

9: A joint investigation unit should be established to coordinate the Nordic countries' investigation of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by persons residing in the Nordic countries.

10: In countries and areas where no Nordic country has an embassy or consulate general, the countries could establish and run joint diplomatic and consular missions.

11: The Nordic countries should strengthen their defence cooperation on medical services, education, materiel and exercise ranges.

Several of these areas are also discussed in the report presented by the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence.

12: A Nordic amphibious unit should be established based on existing units and the current cooperation between Sweden and Finland. The unit could be employed in international operations. In the longer term, the unit should develop its own Arctic expertise.

13: The Nordic governments should issue a mutual declaration of solidarity in which they commit themselves to clarifying how they would respond if a Nordic country were subject to external attack or undue pressure.