6 May 2026
Contrary to a common narrative, the Trump administration’s decision in February 2026 to attack Iran was not driven solely by pressure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. While Israeli influence may have played an immediate role, the decision followed several years of US policy aimed at pressuring Iran and remaking the region.
It is commonly perceived that Prime Minister Netanyahu had a major say in President Donald Trump’s decision to join the war against Iran – a war that seemed to make little sense to the US. While Israeli influence may have been a key factor in Trump’s final decision, it does not, by any measure, provide a rigorous lens through which to analyse the US’s role in dealing with Iran, or the Middle East for that matter.
In recent years, the US has supported a shift in the Middle East regional order towards one founded on Israeli military superiority, giving Israel unchecked freedom to pursue military solutions to its conflicts. While the US has not always been able to impose its will on its allies, particularly Israel, it is ultimately the US as a global superpower – not Israel – that shapes the broader regional order.
Iran has challenged US and Israeli influence through its forward defence strategy – building military alliances outside its own borders – and by drawing on its potential for nuclear deterrence. The US and Iran have been cohabiting and competing for influence with varying degrees of intensity in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as through allies in Syria and Yemen. Of all the areas in which Iran has influence, only in Palestine does Israel – rather than the US – directly shape the politics on the ground.
Launching attacks against Iran’s nuclear programme has been among the options considered by all recent US administrations. Since Iran began enriching uranium to 60% – close to the level required for nuclear weapons, as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2021 – the US, and particularly Israel, have carried out targeted strikes against its nuclear programme. Their focus has also shifted from simply slowing Iran’s nuclear progress to more extensive measures aimed at weakening Iran and limiting its influence in the region.
The US and Israeli war on Iran should be seen as a continuation of a process that started much earlier than February 2026. The steps towards remaking the region had already included targeting Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian allies in Iraq and – more indirectly – the Houthis and Syria’s former Bashar al-Assad regime. They have all been national power holders with their local raison d’être, but they were also targeted as Iranian allies.
To bring about a more profound change, the US and Israel have clearly sought ways to impose or support more cooperative governments in those countries where Iran has influence. After the start of the war in Gaza, Israel now controls any emergence of governance in Gaza and seeks to reduce Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank to the local level. The Lebanese government has responded to US demands by demilitarizing and limiting Hezbollah’s power in national decision-making, going so far as to negotiate with Israel for the first time since the 1990s.
When a favourable military opportunity emerged through the weakening of Hezbollah and the empowerment of the Turkish-aligned extremist Islamist coalition Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Iran lost an important pillar of its regional defence in Syria and had to withdraw from the country. The new post-Assad government is now seen as an extension of US influence in the region, although in practice the country is divided into Turkish and Israeli spheres of influence. Pressured by the US, Israel and Syria have also negotiated for the first time in several decades.
To complete the picture, the US has forcefully opposed Iranian alliances in Iraq, used strong financial tools, and militarily confronted pro-Iranian Iraqi groups during the Iran war. This is not to say that the US and Israel had a pre-planned roadmap, but the pattern suggests at least that military steps have led to further opportunities, and the intent for profound change was clear.
Part of the argument that the US was dragged into a war with Iran is the suggestion that Trump was promised momentum towards regime change. While there are conflicting reports about the Trump administration disregarding advice against regime change, the US has an astonishing track record of using force to pressure Iran to change its defence posture and act more cooperatively, with or without regime change.
Against this backdrop, the US and Israeli war against Iran was widely anticipated. Leaders in the Middle East had followed the drastic measures taken by Israel in Gaza and the decapitation strikes against Iranian, Hezbollah, and Hamas leaders. They had also correctly assumed that, during his second term, Trump would be less constrained by international law, multilateral institutions, and domestic negotiations.
Iran has not only been preparing for the possibility of new Israeli strikes but also for a war with the US. The decentralized “mosaic” decision-making of Iranian military institutions, pre-set targets on US bases and allies in the region, and sustained missile and drone capabilities point to preparations for a prolonged war with a superpower.
Experts point out that Iran had not yet made a decision to produce nuclear weapons. In fact, it appears that Iran committed to zero enrichment just before the start of the war. While the nuclear threshold has been a key factor in the underlying conflict, it is not the sole reason for the war itself. Limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities, weakening its allies, degrading its missile capabilities, air force and navy, while setting the stage for regime change are all interconnected parts of the same package rather than seemingly different reasons for the war, as presented by Trump in daily social media posts.
Ultimately, these issues seem to force Iran to coexist according to US ground rules, with or without regime change. The success of this approach is now in serious doubt because the war has not brought about the changes the US wanted. Indeed, the region may prove to be more multipolar than previously thought.
