Russia’s wartime ideology: Radicalization, rent-seeking and securing the dictator

FIIA Briefing Paper
09/2024
A portait of Jussi Lassila with a neutral expression, wearing a grey suit with black shirt underneath, the top button undone. He is standing slightly sideways to the camera.
Jussi Lassila
Äldre forskare

Anti-Western propaganda and the indoctrination of citizens, especially young people, have gradually intensified since the early days of Putin’s rule. However, their radicalization during the war is indicative of the regime’s need for manipulative control rather than reflective of broad support for the regime’s worldview.

The most significant shift in the Kremlin’s wartime propaganda has been its codification in school education since the summer of 2022. This timing reveals more about the regime’s need to justify the war and its consequences than it does about any consistent long-term strategy.

Key actors behind the ideological codification are opportunistically exploiting the current context. Meanwhile, ideological radicals face little opposition, as most citizens show limited interest in their activities.

Despite the regime’s indoctrination practices, the indifference of society suggests that the conditions for a strong anti-Western consensus after Putin will be weak. Such a consensus can only emerge if the future regime, like the current one, is able to maintain satisfactory material conditions and a tolerable daily life alongside its ideological views, whatever they may be.

Upp