“Isolating Russia” has always been more of a figure of speech than an actual Western policy. Yet Washington’s re-engagement with Moscow makes it impossible to even maintain the pretence that such isolation exists. At the same time, these renewed relations call for a discussion about the principles on which a new Western policy towards Russia must eventually be based.
In view of the Trump administration’s intensive engagement in meetings and talks with the Kremlin, and the US President’s reluctance to impose new sanctions on Moscow, the European debate may also, at some point, abandon the familiar mantra of “isolating an aggressive Russia” and shift towards a more “pragmatic” tone.
This is not to say that any such shift is imminent, of course. Replacing the current Western-Russian confrontation with even a modicum of cooperation would, first and foremost, require a fundamental change in Vladimir Putin’s state of mind. However, in order to achieve such a shift, the West would not only have to agree to the surrender of Ukraine and guarantee Putin a veto over key issues of European security – starting with NATO and EU enlargement – but also acknowledge Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space.
If this proves to be a bridge too far for the West, the Kremlin will seek to revise any potential deal. While minor issues may be manageable, larger ones will accumulate – until either an overwhelming crisis erupts or a post-Putin Russia emerges.
The problem is that Russia’s next ruler will not necessarily be any less dictatorial domestically, or less assertive internationally. Putin’s regime relies on the omnipotence of security structures, which will simply not allow a figure with alternative views to rise through the ranks the way Mikhail Gorbachev did in the late Soviet Union. In turn, as the record since the end of the Cold War indicates, the West’s ability to allocate resources to foreign policy tasks will continue to shrink in relative terms due to the rise of the non-West.
That being said, the West could still benefit from discussing its “would-be” Russia policy for the post-Putin era. If changes in the country do occur, against all odds, the West should avoid being caught off guard, as it was in 1991 when the collapse of the USSR took it by surprise.
In such circumstances, it would be crucial for the West to base its Russia strategy on the following principles.
First, the course should be consistent. Slogans like “sanctions and dialogue” or “values and interests” may sound appealing, but in practice, the contradictions between these key components will be insurmountable, and the one offering fewer material gains is likely to be dropped. For instance, despite all the rhetoric about “norms” from European capitals and Brussels, Moscow’s use of weapons against Georgia in 2008 did not disrupt “business as usual” between Russia and the EU. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 did nothing to persuade Berlin to abandon the Nord Stream 2 project. In 2015, the so-called Minsk II agreement, which was far more beneficial for the breakaway entities in Donbas than its predecessor, Minsk I, was imposed on Kyiv by German and French leaders as well, not by Putin alone. The most shameful example came in 2019 when the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided to restore the voting rights of the Russian delegation, which had been suspended after the annexation of Crimea. In a bitter irony, the very body meant to be a watchdog of democratic values took this step despite Moscow’s refusal to comply with any preconditions set by the organization. All this led Putin to assume that, if pressed, Europe would always cave in.
In the same vein, every American president from Bill Clinton onwards demonstrated, early in their terms, an interest in at least deconflicting relations with Moscow. When President Trump took office in 2017, he frequently spoke about “getting along with Russia”, even as his administration confronted Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and the Middle East. Since his return to the White House in 2025, Trump has been giving an even stronger impression in this regard.
Second, while an all-encompassing policy of democracy promotion in Russia would be unrealistic as long as the West lacks both a consensus on the issue and the necessary resources, demanding some degree of internal political liberalization – namely, freedom of expression and competitive elections at lower levels – could be effective. In the mid-2000s, the West, and Europe in particular, too readily acquiesced to Putin’s “sovereignty” narrative, severely damaging their credibility in the eyes of millions of Russians who aspired to democracy, the rule of law, and Europeanization. As a result, the West lost both its target audience and a political ally within Russia. Correcting that policy blunder would be difficult during the war or immediately after it ends, but is nevertheless worth attempting. This avenue would be particularly promising if the new Russian leadership also signalled an interest in achieving some degree of normalization of relations.
Third, business interaction should be based on Western standards of diligence and transparency. Again, for a long time, the opposite held true. Rather than helping to eradicate corruption in Russia, Western business actors were often indulged by the respective authorities and public opinion at home for engaging with Russia on Russia’s terms. Gradually, they started channelling Russian influence and, apparently, corrupt practices back into the West.
Fourth, the “lesser evil” approach should be discarded. In 1993, the West accepted Boris Yeltsin’s use of military force against Russia’s parliament because he was perceived as a “democrat”. In 2011, several Western leaders attempted to publicly endorse Dmitry Medvedev’s new presidential bid. While the latter case may have been diplomatically inappropriate, it was not particularly damaging, as Putin had never transferred real power to Medvedev. In the former case, however, the West condoned placing force above the rule of law, indirectly paving the way for future Russian leaders to attempt to resolve political problems through violence, including war.
Only if these principles are upheld by the West, and only if Russia’s future leaders have sufficient reason to believe that the Western policy towards Russia will indeed be guided by these principles, can a “reset” eventually become a reality. But even then, it may take decades before a stable and cooperative bilateral relationship between the West and Russia can supersede today’s antagonism.
Photo: Kirill Kudryavtsev / AFP / Lehtikuva
