China in the Arctic governance system in the new Cold War era

This chapter argues that China plays an increasingly influential role in the post-February 2022 Arctic governance system, especially in the contexts of environmental, economic, and military governance. Due to the party-state’s limited role in the Arctic Council, global institutions are currently the most important platforms for China to contribute to Arctic environmental governance. As for Arctic economic governance, Chinese actors play a crucial role in defining political conditions under which international Arctic economic projects may operate, as its continued operations in the Yamal LNG Project demonstrate. Yet, intensifying great power rivalry makes the ability of Chinese companies to access the region increasingly challenging, restricting the indirect role of Chinese actors in defining regional business practices. Finally, the military governance system has changed significantly in the post-February 2022 Arctic; a process in which China has underlined its in-principle opposition to NATO enlargement. NATO’s Arctic expansion certainly diminishes China’s room for manoeuvre at a regional level, leaving Russia as the only plausible partner for Beijing’s Arctic military and paramilitary aspirations. The chapter concludes that in the coming years, China’s policy choices, especially concerning its military and economic cooperation with Russia, undoubtedly stand to shape the future of the Arctic governance system.