European military support to Ukraine during the full-scale war marks a departure from Europe’s previous stance of avoiding military cooperation with Ukraine. This article mobilises the Interactionist Role Theory and the conceptual pair of international society and competition to analyse why restraint constitutes a pattern in Europe–Ukraine relations. It finds several role conflicts that have prevented military cooperation with Ukraine, including Europe’s prioritised partnership with Russia, focus on a civilian role, prioritised engagements elsewhere, and conflicting conceptions of the Ukrainian Other.
In 2022, these role conflicts were transformed to an extent: European states cut ties to Russia, adopted more military roles, pivoted their focus to the East, and updated their views on Ukraine. The article explores how these role conflicts both emerged and were partially resolved through interactive role-taking, role-making, and alter-casting. By doing so, it demonstrates that what looked like an international society among European power centres was always penetrated by competition, and these logics were just reinterpreted in 2022. The article highlights the usefulness of Interactionist Role Theory in analysing shifts in the security system and proposes elaborations on the coherent use of the concepts of role conflict and role change on one hand and role-taking, role-making, and alter-casting on the other hand.
