Accelerated brain drain makes the failures of Russia’s authoritarian modernization tangible and deepens the country’s long-term problems. At the same time, it reduces the political pressure on the administration to make the country more attractive to educated and internationally oriented citizens.
It is estimated that 1.6–2 million people have emigrated from Russia during the nearly 20-year period of Vladimir Putinʼs rule. In the light of these figures, some researchers talk about the fifth wave of emigration in Russian history. Especially after Putin began his third presidency since 2012, emigration has accelerated and in 2017, for example, an estimated 377,000 people moved out of Russia. However, the actual number of people leaving the country is controversial because of vague statistics on immigration and emigration. For example, Russian State Statistics Center Rosstat classifies as emigrants those non-Russian persons who have entered the country with a work permit and leave it after expiration, but often return soon. An even more challenging statistical deficit concerns Russians who live permanently abroad but who, according to statistics, are still staying in Russia. A study by the Presidential Academy of the Russian National Economy and Public Administration estimates that almost 90 percent of Russians living abroad retain their place of residence in Russia and are thus still classified as residents in Russia.
This discrepancy is supported by data obtained by comparing emigration statistics reported by Rosstat with the migration statistics of countries where people have emigrated from Russia. For example, in 2016 Rosstat announced that approximately 5,000 people moved to Germany, whereas according to German statistics, approximately 25,000 people migrated from Russia in the same year. In general, differences between the statistics shows that the number of citizens emigrated from Russia exceeds six time the number informed by Rosstat. An indisputable feature in the ambiguous statistics of the Russian emigration is the accelerated brain drain. Approximately 58,000 highly educated people emigrated from Russia in 2017, and the most common age for emigration has been 30–34 years.
In the light of Russiaʼ demographic dynamics, emigration has not been a quantitative problem, as migrant workers, especially from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, have greatly exceeded the number of emigrants. They have filled in low-wage low-productivity jobs, being often at the mercy of the shadow economy without proper labour rights. However, in 2018, immigration no longer compensated for the natural decline of the population, and the demographic trend in Russia turned negative.
Regardless of better opportunities and more open atmosphere, Russia's central cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg in particular, are not able to provide sufficient conditions to keep high-skilled and internationally oriented citizens in Russia. The accelerated brain drain is primarily a challenge related to globalization and points at inability of Putinʼs regime to redeem the goals of economic modernization and better labour productivity, echoed in the Kremlinʼs rhetoric for years.
Attractive labor markets for highly educated citizens are vital for economic modernization. However, such markets include political risks. When the first decade of economic growth in the 21st century offered new opportunities for all Russians, including internationally oriented citizens in big cities, expectations of the latter changed dramatically after 2011. The political dimension of the accelerated brain drain is related to the post-protest turn of 2011-12. This is not only visible in the number of emigrants, but in particular in reasons why the country was left. Based on interviews with Russian emigrants, the three most important reasons for emigration after 2012 have been the political climate in Russia, the lack of civil liberties and the lack of economic perspectives. For those who emigrated before 2012, these reasons were, for their part, education, financial insecurity and professional reasons.
The political dimension of emigration is also reflected in the increase in the number of asylum seekers coming from Russia, especially after 2012. The number of applicants has increased year by year, leaving behind the figures of the early 1990s. In 2017, approximately 12,700 Russians applied for protection from EU countries, while in the same year, from the US nearly three thousand. Correspondingly, the correlation between the willingness to move and the opposition spirit is evident in surveys on the willingness to emigrate. In 2018, among the adult population approving Putin's actions, the willingness to emigrate was 12%, while the figure for those opposing Putin was 40%.
In the political sense, however, the willingness of the highly educated, critical and opposition-minded citizens to emigrate, or their actual emigration, is not a problem for the authoritarian regime in the short term. It offers an immanent valve to unleash growing social dissatisfaction by keeping borders open to the world. The most dangerous political activism, political organization and social criticism against the regime are closely linked to the highly educated young urban population. However, this approach, which diminishes citizens' skills and changing needs, does not provide a permanent solution to the Kremlin's reluctance to renew its lost social contract with educated urban youth. If the Kremlin wants to keep the borders open to the West, it should reassess influences from there otherwise than just by fighting them, or letting the skilled citizens to leave. With the current developments, innovations and technological breakthroughs echoed in the Kremlin speeches will remain speeches.
