Russia’s 2025–2026 internet shutdowns and restrictions show that its digital authoritarianism has accelerated from content-level control, such as blocking individual websites, to controlling access at the network level.
This approach poses a direct threat to Europe’s normative and regulatory power by normalizing state control over the internet, undermining open-network principles, and promoting a sovereignty-first model of internet governance.
Russia is not only tightening domestic control but also exporting censorship practices and technical capabilities, particularly to countries that cooperate closely with it. This helps spread authoritarian governance models beyond Russia’s borders.
Yet despite greater internal control, Russia’s digital infrastructure is increasingly dependent on external supply chains, largely facilitated by China. This creates vulnerabilities that can be targeted through sanctions and export controls.
The EU should treat the preservation of a rights-based, open internet as a core security objective. This involves countering the normalization of repression in global forums, enforcing restrictions on dual-use technologies, supporting resilient connectivity for civil society trapped in authoritarian states, and incorporating digital rights into its external partnerships.
