12 May 2026
The US-Israeli war against Iran is weakening Russia’s position in the Middle East and beyond. Any additional revenue the Kremlin generates from rising oil prices will not compensate for its political losses. Only if the conflict becomes protracted might Russia regain ground in the region. A relatively quick American victory would expose Russia’s inability to protect its closest partners in a full-scale conflict with the US.
For at least two decades, the Middle East has been an important pillar of Russia’s international standing. The main reason for this was not Russia’s intervention in Syria (2015–2024), although its military presence there undoubtedly played a role, demonstrating that Moscow was able to sustain a large-scale military operation relatively far from its borders. Rather, the crucial factor was Russia’s ability to balance its regional relationships. All local players – from Israel to Iran and from the Gulf States to Turkey – were at least open to pragmatic cooperation with Moscow on specific issues, including energy, and some even sought a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia.
This status quo started to erode in October 2023. Following Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel and Israel’s subsequent massive response in Gaza, the Kremlin expressed solidarity with the Palestinian side, albeit not always directly or unequivocally. From that moment onwards, Russia could no longer take it for granted that Israel would continue to refrain from supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s invasion. A year later, in December 2024, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria put all of Russia’s regional gains at risk. The US-Israeli attacks on Iran further complicated Russia’s situation in the Middle East and beyond.
On the one hand, Vladimir Putin gained fresh evidence that his old nickname, “Teflon Vlad”, still applied. At the very moment when Russia was beginning to feel the first economic consequences of its war against Ukraine and Western sanctions, the war in Iran triggered a spike in oil prices. This created the prospect of windfall revenue for the Kremlin, which could enable it to continue the war and seek Ukraine’s capitulation rather than a negotiated solution. In April, Russian budget revenues from oil and gas increased by almost 40% compared with March.
On the other hand, Moscow had no choice but to stand with Iran. Although Iran is not Russia’s formal military ally, it has emerged as an indispensable partner. It has supplied Russia with weapons, including drones, and helped it constrain the strengthening of the Turkish-Azerbaijani axis in the South Caucasus. Not least, Iran has purchased Russian technologies that are not otherwise in great demand internationally. In his telegram to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian following the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, Putin made his position clear, describing the actions of the United States as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law”.
However, Russia has paid the price for siding with Iran. Its consulate general in Isfahan was damaged in the bombing. The nuclear power plant in Bushehr, which Russia is constructing, was bombed several times, forcing the evacuation of most Russian personnel, while Iran’s Caspian Sea port of Bandar-e Anzali, a key logistics hub for Russian-Iranian trade, was apparently deliberately targeted and suffered extensive damage.
Furthermore, Moscow’s pro-Iran stance has implications that extend beyond Russia’s relations with the US and Israel. This stance is also straining Russia’s relations with the Gulf monarchies and has already had an impact on the cohesion of the BRICS group. India – and plausibly China as well – are unwilling to be dragged into the conflict, even though Iran joined the BRICS+ format in 2024. The fact that Pakistan, rather than a BRICS country, attempted to mediate between Iran and the US illustrates this reluctance and the group’s limited cohesion.
For as long as Donald Trump chooses to overlook Moscow’s actions, which reportedly include transferring intelligence to Iran, the damage to Russia’s position in the region and beyond may remain limited. However, if the US president changes his mind and starts to see Russia as part of the problem and Ukraine – with its extensive experience in anti-drone defence – as part of the solution, the consequences for Moscow could be quite painful. The most immediate risk for Russia would arise if the Gulf countries considered it worthwhile to seek Ukraine’s assistance with air defence and, in return, agreed to provide Kyiv not only with financial support but also with direct military-technical aid.
If the war becomes protracted and exposes the US failure to achieve its goals by military means, a search for a new regional security balance in the Middle East may follow. Only under such conditions might Moscow have a chance to partially regain the influence it had enjoyed until recently. By contrast, a relatively quick and decisive US victory would demonstrate Russia’s inability to protect its partners if they became involved in a full-fledged military conflict with the US.
Photo: Evgenia Novozhenina, AFP / Lehtikuva
