14 April 2026
The challenges of holding elections in a country at war are significant, but postponing them indefinitely is also risky. If elections – the key element of Ukraine’s political system – erode further, post-war Ukraine may become far less capable of developing democratic institutions. Ukraine’s Western partners should engage Kyiv in a discussion on how to mitigate this risk.
On 21 April 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyy triumphantly won the second round of Ukraine’s presidential election. In July of the same year, his party, “The Servant of the People”, won a majority in the early Verkhovna Rada elections held after the new president dissolved parliament.
This was the last time national elections were held in Ukraine. In February 2022, Ukraine was invaded by Russia. According to Ukraine’s constitution, elections cannot take place while the country is at war and martial law is in force.
Seven years is a very long time for a country like Ukraine. By comparison, in the previous seven years, Ukraine held five national elections altogether. During that period, the country experienced one dramatic historical event after another: the rise and fall of Viktor Yanukovych’s autocratic regime, the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and, finally, an armed conflict with pro-Russian breakaway entities in Donbas, which eventually led to the full-scale war with Russia.
Yet even during this period of unending crisis, the ironclad rule of Ukrainian politics was reliance on elections as the main mechanism for resolving systemic crises. Furthermore, the decision as to who would be in power was indeed left to the voters. This role of elections – and the necessity to compete in campaigns and win votes – was universally accepted by oligarchs and populists, liberals and leftists alike, regardless of regional affiliation or geopolitical orientation. Elections were the cornerstone of legitimacy, especially for those who came to power after the revolutionary events of 2005 and 2014.
Today, the decisive role of the popular vote is constrained by a constitution designed for peacetime but not functioning under wartime conditions. Conceivably, in the mid-1990s, when the constitution was adopted, a long war and martial law seemed so improbable that the authors of the document may have decided not to devote any time to this section of the country’s fundamental law.
The war with Russia has affected Ukrainian society and politics on an unprecedented scale. Many institutions have become dysfunctional or irrelevant. Parliament, the cabinet of ministers, and political parties have all lost authority in the eyes of the public, as well as their practical role in decision-making. The shortage of new people willing to fill political positions, coupled with fatigue among long-serving office-holders, can no longer be hidden.
This erosion is illustrated by President Zelenskyy’s attempt in March 2026 to restore discipline within his party, when he publicly warned MPs that those failing to perform their duties would be sent to the front. Equally telling is the fact that two leaders of the parliamentary opposition – former president Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of the political bloc bearing her name – are facing criminal investigations, along with a total of 41 parliamentarians.
Recent dismissals and reshuffles of top figures have done little to ease these concerns. The removal of Andriy Yermak, once the powerful head of the Presidential Office and a personal friend of the president, and the reassignment of Denys Shmygal, the longest-serving former prime minister, first to the position of defence minister and soon to that of energy minister, suggest that the problem is systemic. Suspicions of corruption within the president’s inner circle deepened further and triggered a political crisis in the summer of 2025 after the president’s loyalists attacked Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. The law that eliminated their independence was repealed after large-scale protests erupted across the country, but this did not fully restore public confidence.
By showing reluctance to even discuss elections during the war, Zelenskyy is trying to preserve the status quo. However, the costs of this inertial approach are rising. The legitimacy of both the president and parliament is weakening, which is troubling for a country at war. More importantly, Ukraine’s culture of democratic participation is being undermined.
In such a situation, the question of elections must be taken seriously, as elections themselves may become a key element in resolving a political crisis. While it is self-evident that holding elections before achieving peace would pose legal, political, and practical challenges, postponing them indefinitely carries its own risks.
The role of the West here may – or rather should – be twofold. One task is to explain to Kyiv the political expediency of holding elections. This conversation does not have to be public, but Ukrainian authorities need to recognize that elections will have a stabilizing effect on the internal situation, even if announced as a conditional commitment. This would signal to citizens both inside Ukraine and abroad that the national leadership is willing and determined to return to democratic practices.
The second task stems from the understanding that organizing elections in wartime would be a costly undertaking, a logistical conundrum, and a security nightmare, requiring extraordinary lawmaking and communication. Here, the West can provide legal expertise and financial resources.
Currently, Western actors are preoccupied with addressing the immediate threats to Ukraine’s existence as a state and a nation. At the same time, open discussions about security guarantees, economic reconstruction, and European integration offer Ukrainians a modicum of hope for the future. But the opportunity to implement these plans may never arise if Ukraine loses one of the key features that distinguishes it from most of its post-Soviet neighbours – the practice of free, fair, and regular elections.
Photo: Sergei Supinsky, AFP / Lehtikuva
