25 February 2026
The initiative to relaunch a separate European dialogue with Moscow may sound attractive to many. It is unlikely, however, to facilitate peace in Ukraine. It will instead reinforce the Kremlin’s perception – right or wrong – of Europe as a weak player. For that reason, European leaders should seek a place at the negotiating table alongside the US, not parallel to it, even if both Moscow and Washington resist.
The proposal by French President Emmanuel Macron to re-engage in dialogue with Moscow, reiterated during the Munich Security Conference, is gaining traction.
Among domestic audiences, the initiative is likely to be welcome in various quarters, from ideologically committed pacifists and principled opponents of rising defence expenditure to those sceptical of Ukraine’s integration into Europe. Internationally, quite a few European leaders are unwilling to cede Washington a monopoly on speaking with Moscow. They argue, quite logically, that since Europe provides massive resources to Ukraine, it should take part in the diplomatic process as well. Reportedly, a high-level French diplomat has already visited Moscow, but apparently without much success.
The problem – perhaps counter-intuitively for many – is that establishing new channels for exchanging views is not an achievement in its own right. The effort will only make sense 1) if it helps to stop the war in Ukraine on terms beneficial, or at least acceptable, to Kyiv and not imposed on it by Western partners, whatever their motivation; and 2) if it guarantees peace and security for Europe in the long run. Unfortunately, positive outcomes cannot be taken for granted in this case. Moreover, unless the following issues are addressed, the opposite may become probable.
First, it is not clear what the added value of this new diplomatic format would be, what concessions European capitals and Brussels would offer Moscow, and what trade-offs they would expect in return. Obviously, the Kremlin will be interested in having frozen Russian assets in Europe returned, in seeing economic sanctions lifted, and in securing the non-deployment of troops from European NATO members to Ukraine. But reciprocity should not be assumed. After a year of Donald Trump’s attempts to reach a compromise, Russian demands have not softened an inch.
Second, between 2014 and 2022, Europe pursued a course towards Russia known as “sanctions and dialogue”. This approach was embodied in the so-called “Five Principles” of Federica Mogherini, adopted in 2016 on her initiative as the then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Ultimately, however, “dialogue” prevailed over “sanctions” and the seemingly promising strategy completely failed to prevent Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Claiming, or even hoping, that today’s Europe is immune to a repetition of this experience would be irresponsible.
Relatedly, it should also be remembered that during the same period, 2014–2022, France was at the centre of the so-called Normandy Four – a grouping of states also including Germany, Russia and Ukraine – which attempted to promote a resolution to the conflict between Ukraine and its breakaway entities in Donbas. In December 2019, a summit of the leaders of the four countries was held in Paris, which has remained the only face-to-face meeting between Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy to this day, but no agreement was concluded. Why should Paris, or any other European capital, anticipate success where they suffered a fiasco before?
Third, and most importantly, Europe’s persistence in seeking to relaunch its “own” dialogue with Russia would put it in the position of the supplicant, something Moscow would view as a sign of weakness. Arguably, it was precisely the perception of Europe as divided and unconsolidated, politically and militarily weak, and economically dependent on Russian energy resources, and therefore ready to make concessions, that was a crucial factor in the miscalculation behind the Kremlin’s decision to start the war – the other being a total lack of understanding of Ukraine. If a similar assessment were made now and Europe were again deemed a “weakling”, unable to defend itself without the US, the likelihood of a military conflict with Russia, which is already considered possible and widely feared, would only increase.
The word “dialogue” sounds positive to most people and may genuinely be viewed by its proponents as low-hanging fruit. But in today’s circumstances, choosing the path of least resistance, under whatever name, could do more harm than good. A formal place for Europe at the negotiating table alongside the US could eventually make a difference. A separate “dialogue” that would at best be yet another platform for registering disagreements, and at worst be conducted to maintain the illusion of progress in Europe’s relations with Russia and paid for with Europe’s unilateral concessions, is hardly worth the effort.
Photo: Charles Platiau / AP / Lehtikuva
