31 March 2026
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Northern Europe has become a more cohesive and influential actor in European security. As the continent’s security enters a new, uncertain phase, this momentum must not be allowed to fade. The region now needs firmer and broader security policy dialogue and coordination – for example, under a revitalised Northern Group.
Over the four years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Northern Europe’s role in European security has grown markedly. The war has had a significant cohesive effect on the subregion, drawing its countries closer together. Cooperation across multiple institutionalised and ad hoc formats has flourished, further reinforced by Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Northern Europe’s increasing significance has been evident across a range of issues and domains. Northern European countries have been among the most forward-leaning supporters of Ukraine, both militarily and politically. Their leaders have played an active role in managing relations with an increasingly mercurial Washington on European security issues, including through the Coalition of the Willing supporting Ukraine.
Furthermore, defence spending is rising sharply across Northern Europe, and the region’s allies have been among the most vocal proponents of strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence. Northern Europe – the Baltic Sea and the European Arctic in particular – has also become a centre of gravity in NATO–Russia contestation in its own right.
Closer Northern European coordination
This growing weight should not, however, be taken for granted. European security is entering a new phase marked by uncertainty over an array of critical issues, such as Ukraine’s future place in the European security architecture, the transatlantic balance of responsibilities, and the level of US commitment to Europe, as well as the aims, scope and instruments of Europe’s approach to Russia.
These developments directly affect the core interests of Northern European countries. The region should therefore further consolidate itself as a political force capable of shaping the evolving contours of European security, both through national diplomatic efforts and through more coordinated action in multilateral settings.
Closer Northern European coordination is essential for several reasons. First, most Northern European countries favour a primarily deterrence-based approach to Russia, rooted in their assessment of Moscow as an enduring and acute threat. A common line would strengthen their influence in European debates.
Second, the region shares a clear interest in anchoring Ukraine firmly within the Western security architecture, bringing it as close to NATO as political conditions allow. A militarily strong Ukraine aligned with the West would strengthen security along the long NATO–Russia frontline and, by extension, also enhance Northern European security. Reflecting this interest and the desire to learn from Ukraine’s wartime experience, Ukraine was granted an enhanced partnership status with the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in November 2025.
Third, Northern Europe should clarify its role in a more European NATO, identify where American capabilities remain indispensable, and act together to keep the US constructively engaged in Europe in general and in Northern Europe in particular.
To advance these and other shared interests, Northern European actors should further align their threat assessments and their understanding of their own and the broader European security environment, thereby establishing a firmer basis for joint action. Achieving this requires more regular and institutionalised security-focused dialogue among all relevant regional stakeholders.
A reinvigorated Northern Group
Northern Europe is already dense with cooperation formats: Nordic Cooperation, the Nordic-Baltic Eight, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and the UK-led JEF, among others. These formats reflect different historical eras, practical functions, and political needs, but none of them captures Northern Europe as a whole. There is, however, an existing framework that does fulfil that function: the Northern Group.
Established in 2012 as a British-led defence forum, the Northern Group brings together the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and – unlike the more high-profile and operationally focused JEF – also includes Germany and Poland. Unless the JEF is expanded to include the continental duo, the Northern Group remains the only forum that encompasses all the key Northern European countries.
So far, the Northern Group has operated at the level of defence ministers and senior defence and military officials. Yet its potential is considerably greater. Given its composition, it would be a natural forum for addressing broader European security questions.
That said, reflecting the overcrowded security agenda in European capitals – particularly in London – the group did not convene at the ministerial level in 2025. Rather than being discarded, the format could be reinvigorated with a broader agenda.
It could expand to include foreign ministers and develop more systematic political coordination. In time, it could even convene at the level of heads of state and government. Leadership could remain with the United Kingdom, but ownership might also be shared – for example, by rotating the chair between London, Berlin and Warsaw. Active leadership from the region’s larger countries is essential for strengthening cooperation in Northern Europe.
The inclusion of Germany is particularly important. If Northern Europe is to carry real weight in European security, Germany must be firmly anchored within it – as a leading defence spender, a key actor in Baltic Sea security, and a state whose Russia policy is particularly consequential for Europe as a whole.
The growing cohesion of Northern Europe since 2022 has been an understated but significant development in European security. As the continent enters a new phase of uncertainty, this cohesion should be sustained and further developed. Northern Europe would benefit from an umbrella framework that enables regular dialogue and policy coordination across the region. Reinvigorating the Northern Group could help turn Northern Europe from a cluster of like-minded states into a more coordinated force in European security.
Photo: Jürgen Randma / Government Office of Estonia, CC BY-NC 2.0
