Japan and strategic connectivity: Policies, partners, and possibilities

International Centre for Defence and Security ICDS.

Ammattiyhteisölle suunnatut julkaisut, Muut, Ulkoiset julkaisut
2026
Bart Gaens
Vanhempi tutkija
A portrait of Ville Sinkkonen with a neutral expression, wearing a dark navy suit, a light blue button-up with a silvergrey tie. He is standing slightly sideways to the camera.
Ville Sinkkonen
Johtava tutkija
Yennie Wrenn Lindgren

Jagannath Panda

Prannavan Surendran

This report analyses the increasingly important role of infrastructure development and connectivity
as a central arena of global geopolitical competition, particularly focusing on Japan’s connectivity
policy under the banner of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Infrastructure, institutions, and
norms are becoming weaponised in a dynamic geopolitical competition, linking development,
security, and great-power rivalry. China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013,
served as the initial catalyst, prompting other major players – including Japan, the US, the EU, and
India – to roll out their own competing strategies. The core aim of this report is to explore how
Japan seeks to utilise strategic connectivity, specifically through its multi-layered approach, as a
pivotal geopolitical instrument to project influence and promote a rules-based order, amidst rising
competition with China.

Japan’s policy aligns Official Development Assistance (ODA), economic cooperation, security
considerations, and national interests. Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines, is a prime focal
region, showcasing the integration of physical, institutional, and people-to-people connectivity
with increased defence connectivity through tools such as Official Security Assistance (OSA).
Furthermore, Japan has sought to collaborate with external actors in third regions. However, while
Japan’s cooperation with India and the EU signals diplomatic alignment, the practical impact has
been limited due to implementation difficulties, bureaucratic fragmentation, and weak privatesector incentives.

As an illustrative case study of a potential collaborative effort, the India–Middle East–Europe
Economic Corridor (IMEC) can offer an alternative to China’s connectivity dominance. Japan
is uniquely positioned to stabilise the IMEC and provide essential governance, regulatory
harmonisation, and soft infrastructure. However, the current volatile politics of ‘disconnectivity’
by the US, Japan’s key ally, poses a major obstacle. The US policy, marked by tariffs, the withdrawal
from international organisations, and a shift towards transactional ‘America First’ deals, creates a
strategic void and raises questions about whether allies can compensate for this retreat.

Overall, a shift in focus in the connectivity debate can be witnessed in policy circles. There is a
growing emphasis on collaborative efforts toward more narrowly defined areas, specifically
economic security, competitiveness, and military security and defence cooperation.

This report offers the following ten actionable policy recommendations, in particular, for the
European Union.

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